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Abstract 
 
 
Discussions about climate change and justice frequently employ dichotomies of 
procedural and distributive justice, and inter- and intra-generational justice. These 
distinctions, however, often fail to acknowledge the diverse experience of climate 
risks, or the contested nature of many proposed solutions. This paper argues for a 
reassessment of debates about climate justice based upon a greater diversity of risks 
and solutions such as integrating the reduction of social vulnerability simultaneously 
with mitigation. In effect, this implies reassessing the implicit use of Rawls’ model of 
justice as fair allocation of predefined risks and solutions, and instead considering 
Sen’s understanding of justice as inclusive debate about which risks require which 
solutions. 
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Highlights 
◦ The paper analyzes implicit assumptions made in many debates about 
climate change and justice, and distinguishes the common frames of 
procedural and distributive justice; and inter- and intra-generational 
justice. 
◦ It argues that the analysis of justice needs to be applied to implicit 
assumptions about how climate change poses risks, and in turn how 
these create apparent solutions; and how far these are shared between 
more and less vulnerable people and countries. 
◦ Models of just allocations of supposedly ‘global’ risks and solutions 
therefore need to be reassessed according to how far they reflect these 
diverse experiences. 
◦ In turn, this analysis implies reassessing implicit Rawlsian approaches to 
justice abased on fair allocation, and exploring a more Senian approach 
of inclusive deliberation about which risks require which solutions. In 
climate change policy this implies reducing social vulnerability and 
building adaptive capacity in ways that are complementary to 
mitigation. 
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Climate justice is not just ice 
 
 
Environmental politics too often conflates what is urgent and distressing with what is 
just. In January 2011, newspapers reported how a female polar bear in the Arctic 
Ocean had swum continuously for an unprecedented nine days, losing her cub. Many 
commentators linked this event to how anthropogenic climate change is melting sea 
ice. ‘Polar bears …only occur in the Arctic where sea ice is found,’ said biologist 
George Durner, who conducted the survey. ‘By reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
we can save sea ice habitat for polar bears.’1 
 
At the same time, environmental activists in the USA were suing their government on 
behalf of polar bears. The government had, in late 2010, refused to amend the US 
Endangered Species Act in order to re-classify polar bears as ‘endangered’ rather than 
the less serious ‘threatened.’ One litigant declared: ‘The Obama administration 
delivered a lump of coal to the polar bear for Christmas. Ultimately, we are confident 
the court will …give polar bears the legal protection to which they are entitled.’2 
 
Asking law courts to issue rights on behalf of polar bears is one example of how 
climate change and justice are now being linked. Yet, while the concerns about polar 
bears and many other aspects of climate change are indeed distressing and need 
attention, it does not always follow that imposing fast solutions is necessarily just. 
                                                 
1 http://www.onearth.org/article/polar-bears-nine-day-swim Accessed November 
2012. 
2 http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2010/polar-bear-12-23-
2010.html  This statement is by the Center for Biological Diversity; other litigants 
include Greenpeace and the Natural Resources Defense Council. Accessed November 
2012. 
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Political processes need to pay more attention to how environmental problems – and 
solutions – are identified and seen as just. 
 
What’s wrong with justice? 
 
Environmental debates frequently use two main dichotomies to define justice. Yet, 
both overlap more than commonly thought. Both need to be rethought.  
 
The first dichotomy distinguishes distributive and procedural justice (Okereke, 2010a, 
b; Schlosberg, 2007; Sowers, 2007). Rawls’ (1971) classic discussion is most 
associated with distributive justice because it seeks a fair allocation to all parties if 
they adopt a procedure – called the ‘veil of ignorance’ – that asks them to imagine a 
fair allocation if no party can control the process of distribution. Sen’s (2009) positive 
critique of Rawls accepts this concept of justice, but also emphasizes procedure by 
arguing that rights of participation and inclusion are still evolving. 
 
The second common dichotomy is between intra-generational justice and inter-
generational justice. The first protects the rights of future generations. The second 
seeks equality between current generations. Usually, these positions are linked to 
more developed societies and currently poorer countries (Redclift, 1987; Shue, 1992).  
 
Both of these dichotomies, however, fall down under two questions: who has defined 
ecological risks? What procedures can allow new participants to redefine risks? 
Rawls’ distributive approach is based on a procedure that does not question 
environmental goods and bads. And the distinction between inter- and intra-
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generational justice is false because inter-generational justice is seeking the same 
rights to protect poorer societies’ future generations through securing access to 
development, with all its capacity to withstand environmental and other risks, today. 
 
Applying justice to environmental problems therefore is not simply based on 
allocating currently perceived risks and solutions, but on expanding how risks and 
solutions are defined. This is not a new activity. For years, much social science has 
emphasized the need to distinguish between protecting ecosystems as underlying 
entities, and in seeing the limitations in ecological concepts that have emerged to 
describe them. Problems emerge when these concepts and explanations are applied 
out of context (Forsyth, 2003, p. 6). 
 
Al Gore’s book, Earth in the Balance (1992, pp. 246-247) famously stated: ‘as it 
happens, the idea of social justice is inextricably linked in the Scriptures with 
ecology.’ This statement clearly justifies norms of social behaviour on the basis of 
fixed and unchanging ‘ecology.’ But Gore’s assertion does imply how social norms 
have defined ‘ecology.’ There is much in Gore’s vision of ecology that is a metaphor 
for acting responsibly within limits. Indeed, ecologists in the 1960s dubbed ecology 
‘the subversive science’ because it represented a communal response to 
individualism. Eugene Odum (1964, p. 15) wrote ‘[ecology] deals with the structure 
and function of levels of organization beyond that of the individual,’ and Paul Sears 
(1964, p. 12) ‘by its very nature, ecology affords a continuing critique of man’s 
operations.’ Some people therefore use ecology as a framework for social justice. But 
the social influences on ecology – as a series of explanations of biophysical processes 
of cause-and-effect – are often only partially explored. 
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One example concerned how questions of including poorer countries were addressed 
under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group III. 
Some members were criticised in the 1990s for calculating the ‘value of life’ in 
accordance with national GDP – a procedure caricatured as valuing ‘one European as 
equal to ten Chinamen’ (Grubb, 1995, p. 471) (see also Vanderheiden, 2005). Yet, 
while policy analysts such as Michael Grubb sought to restore public trust in the 
IPCC by saying ‘there is a danger that economic evaluations… seek to enshrine in 
apparent objectivity the current value system of the practitioner’ (p. 472), other 
apparently objective claims go unexamined. Grubb, for example, starts his paper by 
focusing on ‘the increasingly pressing need for humanity to face the finite nature of 
the planet, and in doing so address the distributional issues relating to coping with the 
impacts of climate change’ (p. 463). In other words, Grubb wishes to assess the 
implicit assumptions in economic analysis of different nations’ vulnerability to 
climate change. But he does not consider how projections of climate change impacts 
themselves might also contain assumptions when applied to ‘humanity.’ How might 
the identification of impacts be based on equitable principles? And how does this 
affect the justice of proposed solutions? 
 
Rethinking distributive and procedural environmental justice 
 
Both the fixed basis of climate change impacts and the categories used to evaluate 
inclusiveness in climate change policy need to be rethought to achieve a fairer form of 
climate justice. The distribution of climate change solutions need to be defined in 
 8 
ways that do not delegitimize appropriate economic growth; or which create 
additional risks from imposed policies. 
 
For example, in a recent World Bank publication, experts in the Environment Section 
called for a greater restoration of natural ecosystems as a way to enhance poorer 
people’s ability to cope with climate change impacts – an approach called 
‘Ecosystem-based Approaches to Adaptation’ (World Bank, 2009). This report states: 
‘natural ecosystems are resistant and resilient and provide a full range of goods and 
ecosystem services…’ (p. 47), but then claims ‘agriculture is already one of the 
greatest threats to natural ecosystems worldwide’ (p. 63). This statement does not 
acknowledge that successful agriculture feeds people, provides livelihoods, and can 
contribute to national GDP. Many richer countries better able to cope with climate 
change have partly grown their economies through agriculture. 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has also 
framed policies in terms of fast and low-cost mitigation of greenhouse gas 
concentrations rather than combining these actions with building social and economic 
resilience. ‘Adaptation’ to climate change has been seen mainly as reducing impacts 
of physical events such as floods and storms, rather than more development-oriented 
approaches such as diversifying livelihood options in affected regions (Burton, 2009). 
These approaches seek to address climate-change risk in terms of the additional 
biophysical events that can be linked to greater greenhouse-gas concentrations, rather 
than understand what social, economic, and political lack of capacity might make 
these physical changes problematic among poorer societies. Indeed, mitigation, 
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crudely and cheaply done, can enhance social vulnerability and hence incur additional 
social injustices (Marino and Ribot, 2012). 
 
Accordingly, as things stand, the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund is partly funded through 
a two percent levy on proceeds of certified emissions reduction units coming from the 
UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Yet, critics from developing 
countries have often complained that the CDM has not delivered its original intention 
to enhance ‘sustainable development’ in accordance with the objectives of the 
UNFCCC because it has largely focused on fast mitigation projects such as 
greenhouse gas destruction, rather than building livelihoods or local technological 
capacities in poorer countries (Boyd et al., 2009). Related projects that encourage 
fast-mitigation through carbon-offset forestry have also been claimed to lock up land 
with little immediate developmental benefit. The assumption is that fast mitigation or 
carbon sequestration will benefit all. But, mitigating global greenhouse gas 
concentrations with no attention to local social vulnerability to climate change or 
climate change policies might create additional risks for local people. According to 
(Kjellén, 2006, p. ix) ‘there is a risk that present adaptation strategies may reinforce 
vulnerability, if not properly conceived and legitimately implemented.’  
 
An alternative approach is seeking solutions that mitigate climate change without 
compressing the rights to growth or the protection of vulnerable people. These kinds 
of options incorporate the essence of Rawls’ search for inclusive benefits, but require 
us to reconsider what benefits are being distributed. One possible example is the 
proposed AdMit financial instrument, which seeks investors for projects that can 
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combine mitigation and adaptation. 3  These projects can reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions as well as contribute to poverty reduction, development, and the sustainable 
use of resources. For example, urban waste management can mitigate climate change 
through methane capture and recycling, but also provide livelihoods if they employ 
local waste sorters (Forsyth, 2007). Indeed, new initiatives to integrate climate change 
policy, agriculture and food security 4  offer more possibilities for development 
dividends than sequestration alone. These kinds of activities do not just slow down 
physical rates of environmental change – that is to say, keep ice frozen. Instead, they 
also address additional facets of climate risk such as reducing the vulnerability of 
poorer societies in dealing with climate events. They do not assume common benefits 
from a single goal of mitigation alone. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Debates about climate justice need to acknowledge the limitations of commonplace 
uses of phrases such as distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice is only 
possible when there is something to distribute. Procedural justice includes how we 
define, as well as distribute, these objectives fairly. Climate change policy is not 
simply allocating solutions to melting ice. And an inclusive process is not just 
diversifying discussion of how to do this. 
 
So far, environmental politics does not consider deeply enough how, or with whose 
concerns, justice might be applied. Paavola et al. (2006, p. 267) wrote: ‘distributive 
                                                 
3 http://www.iied.org/climate-change/key- issues/economics-and-equity-
adaptation/admit#about Accessed November 2012. 
4 http://ccafs.cgiar.org/ Accessed November 2012. 
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justice is unlikely to be able to provide a sufficient foundation for climate justice 
because of the heterogeneity of involved parties. Therefore, procedural justice is 
needed to underpin the legitimacy of climate change regime.’ But this statement does 
not acknowledge the heterogeneity of risks – from both climate change and proposed 
solutions – as well as heterogeneity of parties.  
 
Plus, Page (2006) and Schlosberg (2007) write positively about a Senian capability 
approach to environmental justice. Page (2006, p. 70) claims it can ‘preserve an 
environment that enables future persons to retain the same substantive freedoms to be 
healthy, well fed, and well clothed that their ancestors possessed.’ This statement 
shows that inter-generational justice is also intra-generational. But this assertion does 
not engage with how environmental limits to this process are defined, or how the 
potential benefits and disadvantages of proposed solutions are identified. 
 
Environmental justice therefore needs to consider which risks are to be addressed, and 
to engage with a policy process that is not simply framed by what appear to be urgent 
solutions to problems that are currently seen as distressing. In Rawlsian terms, an 
ideal solution should allow climate policies to address all concerns. But there is a 
need to look beyond commonplace discussions of distribution and procedure, and 
instead see how including more diverse values and priorities of affected people might 
influence what is seen as urgent. An ideal solution does not overlook some people’s 
concerns, or make their problems worse.  
 
‘Justice’ is not simply a quick reference to acting ethically, but rather a source of 
reasoning for what is considered legitimate. At worse, it can become ‘a mere cover 
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for self- interested bargaining’ (Okereke, 2010, p. 463). The Rawlsian model of 
distributive justice should not be applied without reconsidering what it assumes are 
the risks to be distributed. We should not let an epistemological, ‘veil of ignorance’ 
deceive us that what we think are natural limits or appropriate solutions are 
universally applicable or without potential negative impacts on others. 
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